Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

ROBERT PILOT, Plaintiff / Appellant, vs. EARL N. HILL, Defendant /
Appellee. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Karra J. Porter, Kristen C. Kiburtz; Edward T. Wells; attorneys for appellant.
Kristin VanOrman, Jessica Johnston; attorneys for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Pilot v. Hill, No. 20160959 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/4094

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons.
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback.

!.

2.51

I

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT PILOT,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
Case No. 20160959-CA
vs.

EARL N. IDLL,
Defendant / Appellee.

'I

Appeal from a Final Order and Judgment of the Honorable Kara Pettit of the Third
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah
Third District Court No. 140500187

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROBERT PILOT

Karra J. Porter, 5223
Kristen C. Kiburtz, 12572
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. ·
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2047
Telephone: (801) 323-5000

Kristin VanOrman
Jessica Johnston
STRONG & HANNI
102 South 200 East, Suite 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

Edward T. Wells
THE PERSONAL INJURY LAW FIRM
4424 ~outh Century Drive
Murray, UT _84123
Telephone: (801) 312-8088
Attorneys for PlaintiffI Appellant
FILED

UTAH APPELLATE.COURTS

JUL 2 6 2017
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT PILOT,

Plaintiff/ Appellant,
Case No. 20160959-CA
vs.
EARL N. HILL,

Defendant / Appellee.

Appeal from a Final Order and Judgment of the Honorable Kara Pettit of the Third
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah
Third District Court No. 140500187

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROBERT PILOT

Karra J. Porter, 5223
Kristen C. Kiburtz, 12572
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2047
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
~

Kristin VanOrman
Jessica Johnston
STRONG & HANNI
102 South 200 East, Suite 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

Edward T. Wells
THE PERSONAL INJURY LAW FIRM
4424 South Century Drive
Murray, UT 84123
Telephone: (801) 312-8088
Attorneys for PlaintiffI Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(§

ARGUMENT .....................................•..................................................................... 1
I.

MR. HILL IMPLIEDLY CONSENTED TO TRY THE ISSUE OF
TIER III DAMAGES TO THE JURY ....................................................... 1
A.

Mr. Hill had reason to believe that Tier ill damages were at issue
in this case ............................................................................................ 2
1.

There is no overlap between a Tier II and Tier III claim
for damages over the $299,999 limit ......................................... 3

2.

Mr. Pilot did not expressly consent to try the case as a
Tier II case ................................................................................ 7

B.

Prejudice is not relevant to a determination under Rule
15(b)(l), and even if it were, Mr. Hill suffered no prejudice in
this case .............................................................................................. 11

C.

This Court should reject Mr. Hill's request to interpret the
language of Rule 8(a) based on policy grounds ............................. 14

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 18

LD

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Arbogast Family Trustv. River Crossing, LLC, 2010 UT 40,238 P.3d 1035 ....... 15
Berg v. Berg, 2012 UT App 142,278 P.3d 1071 ...................................................... 9
Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518, 127 P.3d 1224 ............................................. 13
Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinger, 793 P.2d 393 (Utah Ct App 1990) .............. 10, 11
Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 UT App 270 263 P.3d 440 ........................................ 10
Florez v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 2010 UT App 254,240 P.3d 107 .................. 10
General Ins. Co. ofAmer. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506
(Utah 19 76) ........................................................................................................ 12
Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, 135 P.3d 861 ............................................................ 16
Guss v. Cheryl Inc., 2010 UT App 249, 240 P.3d 1142 ................................... 13, 14
Hillv. Estate ofAllred, 2009 UT 28,216 P.3d 929 ..................................... 3, 5, 11, 12
Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 103 P.3d 135 ...................................................... 5, 6, 7
Miller v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 2012 UT 54, 285 P.3d 1208 .............................. 6, 7
Southwestern Stationary and Bank Supply, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 624 F .2d 168
(lOili Cir. 1980) ............................................................................................. 3, 4, 5
St. Jeor v. Kerr Corp., 2015 UT 49, 353 P.3d 137 ................................................. 16
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P .2d 168 (Utah 1977)................................................. 10, 11
j

~

Rules

Utah. R. of Civ. P. 15(b) ..................................................................................... passim
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2) .............................................................................. 12, 14, 18
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 ............................................................................................. 14, 15
Utah R. Ci v. P. 8 ...................... ................................................................. 1, 6, 14, 17

~

111
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

ARGUMENT

I.

MR. HILL IMPLIEDLY CONSENTED TO TRY THE ISSUE OF
TIER III DAMAGES TO THE JURY.
Mr. Pilot's opening brief argued that a party impliedly consents to an

amendment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(l) if: (1) evidence is
presented at trial with no objection that that evidence is outside of the complaint, and
(2) the opposing party has a reason to believe that the evidence injects a new issue into
the case. Mr. Pilot further argued that the trial court erred in not amending Mr. Pilot's
~

tier designation because Mr. Hill impliedly consented to the amendment when he did
not object to Tier III damages being presented to the jury, and he had reason to know
the jury was being asked to award Tier III damages.
In response, Mr. Hill does not dispute the requirements set forth by Rule
15(b)(l). Nor does Mr. Hill dispute that the first element of the Rule is present.
Instead, he argues this Court should affirm the trial court's application of Rule 15(b)(l)
because he allegedly had no reason to believe that Tier III damages were at issue in
this case. Additionally, he argues that the trial court correctly refused to amend under
Rule 15(b)(l) because Mr. Hill would have been prejudiced by such an amendment.

0P

Finally, Mr. Hill argues that, for policy reasons, this Court should interpret Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a) as not allowing an amendment under Rule 15(b). Mr. Hill's
arguments are not persuasive.

1
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First, contrary to Mr. Hill's suggestion, he did have reason to believe Tier III
damages were at issue in this case. Second, prejudice is irrelevant to a determination
of whether an amendment is required under Rule 15(b)(l), and even if it were relevant,

Mr. Hill suffered no prejudice in this case. Lastly, the plain language of Rule 8(a)
states that a plaintiffs tier designation can be amended under Rule 15. Mr. Hill's
policy arguments cannot override the plain language of the Rule, and, in any event,
lack merit.
A.

Mr. Hill had reason to believe that Tier III damages were at issue in
this case.

The second prong of Rule 15(b)(l) focuses on whether the opposing party
would have reason to believe a new issue was being injected in the case. (See Aplt.
Br., pp., 14-23 (discussing second element of Rule 15(b)(l).) Under this prong, courts
analyze whether the unpled and pled claims are so similar that a party would not
understand that the evidence being presented at trial was aimed at the unpled claim.

Mr. Hill does not appear to dispute this statement of the law. (See Opp. Br., p. 14.)
Instead, he argues two reasons why he had no reason to believe that Tier III damages
were at issue in this case. First, he claims tha~ damage evidence relevant to prove a
Tier III damage claim is also relevant to prove a Tier II claim, and therefore, he did not
know that the evidence being presented was aimed at an unpled issue. Second, he
alleges that Mr. Pilot agreed that Tier III damages were not at issue in this case. As
explained below, neither of these arguments has merit.
2
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1.

There is no overlap between a Tier II and Tier III claim for
damages over the $299,999 limit.

~

Mr. Hill argues that he had no reason to believe that Tier III damages were

being injected into this case because "the evidence relevant to Pilot's unpled claimthat his total damages exceeded [$299 ,999]-was also relevant to the pleaded issue of
whether Pilot was entitled to receive up to [$299,999] in damages." (Opp. Br., p. 16.)
~

That assertion lacks logical force.
Damages in a Tier II and a Tier III case may have some overlap in the sense
that a jury can award damages of $0 to $299,999 under either designation.
However, their similarities end at that point. A plaintiffs request for more than
$299,999 in damages cannot be a Tier II damage request. Here, not only did Mr.
Pilot present evidence of damages over the Tier II limit, he specifically requested
that the jury award him more than $299,999. It should have come as no surprise to
Mr. Hill that, if the jury believed Mr. Pilot's theory of the case, Mr. Pilot would be
awarded Tier III damages.
Mr. Hill also claims that Hill v. Estate ofAllred, 2009 UT 28,216 P.3d 929, and
Southwestern Stationary and Bank Supply, Inc_. v. Harris Corp., 624 F.2d 168 (10th

~

Cir. 1980), support his position that he did not impliedly consent to an amendment at
trial. These cases do no such thing, and actually support Mr. Pilot's position.
Hill was already discussed at length in Mr. Pilot's opening brief. In Hill, the

court found that defendants did not impliedly consent to amending the plaintiffs
3
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complaint to include a claim for receiving stolen property when defendants did not
object to evidence relevant to that unpled claim being introduced at trial. Central
to the court's holding was that plaintiffs claim for conversion (which was pied)
had almost identical elements to plaintiffs unpled claim for receiving stolen
property. The only difference between these two claims was that "receiving stolen
property" required a finding that the defendants knew the property was stolen. The
court found it significant that the plaintiff never asked the trial court to determine
whether the defendants knew the property was stolen, and without such a request,
along with evidence supporting that request, the defendants would not have known
that the issue of receiving stolen property was being tried in that case.
Southwestern Stationary is in accord. The only issue before the jury in that

case was whether the defendant's conduct constituted "acceptance" under a written
contract. The trial court previously held that the written contract was ambiguous.
The jury was therefore asked to determine what constituted "acceptance" based on
extrinsic evidence, including the discussions between the parties. The jury found
in the plaintiffs favor. However, upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the trial court reversed its previous ruling and held that the written contract
was not ambiguous. The plaintiff then moved to amend his pleadings under Rule
15(b) asserting that the jury's verdict was based on an oral agreement. The trial
~

court refused to amend the plaintiffs complaint under Rule 15(b) to conform to the
4
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~

evidence because it was clear that the jury was never requested to determine
~

whether an oral agreement existed and because the defendants would not have
known that the extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' discussions (although

~

possibly relevant to proving an oral agreement) was being presented for any other
reason than to prove the meaning of the written agreement.
Contrary to Mr. Hill's position, these cases do not stand for the proposition
that whenever there is any overlap between a pied and unpled issue, an opposing
party would have no reason to know that the jury was being asked to consider the

~

unpled issue. In both Hill and Southwestern Stationary, the opposing party had no
reason to know that an unpled claim was being injected into the case because the
issues presented to the jury as relates to both the pied and unpled claims
completely overlapped. Unlike the parties in those cases, however, Mr. Hill had
reason to know (and did in fact know) that the jury was being asked to decide an
unpled issue because there is no overlap between a Tier II and Tier III case above
$299,999. Moreover, Mr. Pilot specifically asked the jury to award him damages
over this amount.
Mr. Hill also argues that he had no reason to know that Tier III damages
were at issue because Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 103 P.3d 135, and Miller v.

Utah Dept. ofTransp., 2012 UT 54, 285 P.3d 1208, "instructed [him] that evidence
of damages in excess of a damage cap [are] relevant to a claim for damages within
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the cap." (Opp. Br., p. 17). These cases provide no such instruction. Both of
these cases involve statutory damage caps. Contrary to Mr. Hill's suggestion,
neither of these cases hold that damages beyond the statutory cap are relevant to
proving damages below that cap.

Rather, Judd stands for the unremarkable

proposition that the legislature does not violate a plaintiffs constitutional right to
have a jury decide the amount of his damages, as long as the jury does, in fact,
decide the entire amount of damages, and the court conforms that award to fit
within the legislature's mandate. 2004 UT 91,

~

35. Likewise, Miller stands for

the proposition that a court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to inform the
jury that damages will later be reduced by a statutory cap when that instruction is
not relevant to the theory or claims being presented in the case. 2012 UT 54, ~ 41.
Neither of the questions addressed by Judd or Miller are relevant in this
case.

Although parties may colloquially refer to the tier system as a cap on

damages, in reality, it is not. Rather, it is a procedure the courts have adopted to
curb abusive discovery practices. The tier system is not based on any inherent
power of the court to limit damages, but operates based on the principle of waiver.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). However, unlike statutory caps, which cannot be undone,

Rule 8(a) makes clear that the waiver is not necessarily permanent. As addressed
in Mr. Pilot's opening brief, Rule 8(a) specifically provides that a party is not
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~

precluded from amending his complaint (and escaping the Tier II limit) under Rule
<@

15. Neither Judd or Miller instruct otherwise.

2.

Mr. Pilot did not expressly consent to try the case as a Tier
II case.

Mr. Hill argues that he had no reason to believe Tier III damages were being
requested in this case because Mr. Pilot's "intent to inject the issue of Tier III
damages into the case was masked by his express consent to try the case as a Tier
II Case during the pretrial conference." (Opp. Br., p. 18.) That argument lacks
~

merit for several reasons.
First, this contention is not supported by the record.

Mr. Pilot never

expressly consented that he would try the case as a Tier II Case. The portion of the
record that Mr. Hill relies on involves a discussion with the trial court regarding
whether the jury should be instructed regarding Tier II damages:

(jjj

And then this last thing just to make sure that I guess I'm
understanding how the parties anticipate approaching the Tier 2 aspect
of it. That you just present your evidence and then if they come up
with a verdict of $300,000 or more, it gets reduced?
MS. VAN ORMAN: Right.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SHELTON: Yeah. And then we deal with that after trial.
(R. 3172-3173.)

7
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Both parties elected to follow a wait-and-see approach. Contrary to Mr.
Hill's suggestion, neither party characterized the initial Tier II designation as
capping Mr. Pilot's ability to recover more if he requested more at trial. Nor did
Mr. Pilot's counsel state that he was going to request and present evidence of over

$299,999 at trial, but that the proper procedure was to "allow the district court to
reduce Pilot's award if the jury rendered a verdict of more than $300,000." (Opp.
Br., p. 7 (citing to Aplt. Br., p. 4). Rather Mr. Pilot's counsel wanted to see how
the evidence would come in at trial and therefore, only agreed to "deal with that
after trial." (See R. 3172-73; see also Aplt. Br., pp. 4-5 ("The parties agreed to a
wait-and-see approach and decided that the Tier II aspect of this case would be
dealt with by the trial court (if at all) after trial.").)
Second, the above discussion was based on the assumption that this case
would be tried as a Tier II case. But that is not what occurred at trial. The jury did
not simply "come up with a verdict of $299,999 or more." Instead, they were
requested to award a verdict in excess of $299,999. At no point during trial was
there any objection to this request.
Third, Mr. Hill expressly consented to try this case as a Tier III case. During
trial, he repeatedly emphasized that Mr. Pilot was asking for an award of well over
$600,000.

According to Mr. Hill, Mr. Pilot's request for so much money

demonstrated that he was being frivolous and lacked credibility:
8
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~

~

• "And yet, you're asking the jury, cause you really love your time off, to
give you over $600,000 in lost wages in this case?" (R. 2916, In. 6-8)
• "And you still want this jury to give you over $600,000 just in lost wages
in this case?" (id. at ln. 21-22.)
• "[Economist Nicolatus] projects this $600,000 loss.

You know, I

calculated that. [Mr. Pilot] made $11,000 in 2011. To make $600,000, it
would have taken him 64 years. And that's not even the lowest, there
was a year he made $8,000. Are you kidding me?" (R. 3039.)
•

"If you believe that any witness has intentionally testified falsely about

any important matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of that
witness or you may disregard only intentionally false testimony." (R.
3040.)

Mr. Hill cannot have his "cake and eat it too." He made a strategic decision not to
object to the Tier III evidence and argument, and instead to emphasize the Tier III
~

aspect of the case so that he could insinuate that plaintiffs claims were allegedly
ridiculous. He cannot himself inject an issue into the case for his own advantage
and then complain when his strategy backfired. See, e.g. Berg v. Berg, 2012 UT
App 142,

,r 6,

278 P .3d 1071 (holding that a party cannot complain that an issue

was tried without his express or implied consent when he himself testified and
introduced evidence regarding that issue); Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 UT App
9
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270,

~

12, 263 P.3d 440 (holding that party cannot claim that issue was tried

without his express or implied consent when "he chose to litigate the issue.");
Florez v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 2010 UT App 254, ~ 42,240 P.3d 107 (holding
issue was tried by implied consent when party produced evidence relevant to the
untried issue).
Finally, contrary to Mr. Hill's suggestion, a party's ability to amend his
complaint is not restricted by pretrial orders or pre-trial proceedings defining the
issues to be decided at trial. For instance, in Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinger, 793
P.2d 393 (Utah Ct App 1990), the parties executed a pre-trial order that was later
signed by the court. The stipulated order stated that the trial would proceed on
only two issues. However, in the stipulated facts submitted to the court, the parties
included facts that would support a third ground for relief. The trial court amended
the pleadings under Rule 15(b) based on the plaintiffs' implied consent.

In

response, the plaintiffs argued that, based on the stipulated order, they would have
no reason to suspect that the pleadings could be amended under Rule 15. This
Court disagreed, and affirmed: "Susan never objected to the facts as stipulated, and
therefore exposed herself to any decision which the evidence would support." Id.
at 395.
Likewise in Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977), a court's pre<hv

trial order specifically defined the damage issues that were to be determined by the
10
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Jury.
@

At trial, however, the plaintiff introduced evidence of another basis for

calculating damages and asked the court to award damages on that basis. The
defendant argued that it was improper for the trial court to deviate from its pre-trial
order. The trial court disagreed and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed: "In this
case ... no objection was made to the introduction of the evidence on which the
court based its finding of fact." Id. at 170. "Rule 16 must be read in light of Rule
l 5(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for liberality in
allowing amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence."

Id.

The

amendment was therefore proper under Rule l 5(b).
Like Stubbs and Wolfinger, the trial court's pre-trial proceedings did not
G@

limit its ability to amend under Rule 15(b). Indeed, the facts in this case are
stronger than Stubbs and Wolfinger.

@

Both of those cases involved stipulated

orders. This case involves a brief pre-trial discussion in which there was no
stipulation that the parties would try the case as a Tier II case.
B.

Prejudice is not relevant to a determination under Rule 15(b)(l),
and even if it were, Mr. Hill suffered no prejudice in this case.

Mr. Hill argues that an amendment und~r Rule 15(b)(l) would be prejudicial
~

under the circumstances of this case. Mr. Hill's argument suffers from the same
flaw as the trial court's holding-prejudice is not relevant under Rule 15(b)(l).
See Utah Rule Civ. P. 15. A court considers prejudice only if a party has objected

at trial. See Hill, 2009 UT 28, ,I 47 ("When an objection is made to evidence on
11
~
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the ground that it is outside the scope of the pleading, then the court may take into
account whether the amendment will serve the merits of the action and whether the
amendment will prejudice the nonmoving party."); General Ins. Co. of Amer. v.

Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976) (holding that under the
first part of Rule 15(b), prejudice, undue delay, or laches is not analyzed).
While Utah courts have analyzed whether a party has had "a fair opportunity
to defend," Hill, 2009 UT 28, ,-f 48, in doing so, they are referring to the second
part of Rule 15-Rule 15(b)(2). Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2) ("The Court
should freely permit an amendment when ... the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the evidence would prejudice that party's action on the merits.") with
Utah Rule Civ. P. 15(b)( 1) ("When an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by
the parties' express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised
in the pleadings.")
That Rule 15(b)(l) does not require prejudice makes sense from a practical
perspective as well. It would be unjust and inefficient to allow a party to consent
to try an unpled issue then, if the outcome does not come out in his favor, allow
him to renege on that consent.

By consenting to the trial of an issue (either

· expressly or impliedly), a party waives his contention that he would be prejudiced
by such an amendment.

12
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411

~

Moreover, even if Rule 15(b)(l) required prejudice, Mr. Hill suffered no
. prejudice in this case. In determining whether a party had a fair opportunity to
defend, Utah courts focus on whether the nonmoving party had notice of the
unpled claims and could defend against them at trial. Guss v. Cheryl Inc., 2010 UT
App 249,

,r 18, 240 P.3d

1142 ("[I]t is apparent from the record that Cheryl, Inc.,

'had a fair opportunity to defend' against such a claim during the trial and
undertook to do so. We can discern no indication of surprise here that can be said
to have prejudiced the company."); Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518, ,r 37, 127
P.3d 1224 ("What a party is entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an
opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required."
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, Mr. Hill does not dispute that he had notice of the damage evidence
@

presented in this case. Nor does he dispute that he was able to confront this
evidence at trial. Indeed, Mr. Hill admits that he did not need more discovery in
this case. Instead, he speculates that, had he known Mr. Pilot would have been
awarded over $299,999 in damages, he might have hired more experts "to further
call into question the severity of Mr. Pilot's injuries." (Opp. Br., p. 21.) That is
not persuasive for several reasons.
First, there is nothing about the Tier II aspect of this case that would have
prevented Mr. Hill from hiring more experts. Regardless of whether this case was
13
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designated as a Tier II or Tier III case, Mr. Hill could have hired as many experts
as he wanted to defend against the claims made by Mr. Pilot. See Utah R. Civ. P.
26(a) (4)(B) & (c)(S).
Second, Mr. Hill's predicament is no different than that faced by any other
litigant at trial. A party is required to object to an unpled issue being tried or face
the consequences. A party, however, cannot (without objection) address an unpled
issue on the merits for its own strategic benefit, and then claim, after the fact, he
would have done more during discovery "to further call into question" a plaintiffs
claims had he known his strategy would prove unsuccessful with the jury. That is
not the type of prejudice referred to by Rule 1S(b)(2). Rather, as discussed above,
the question is one of notice. Under Rule 15(b)(1 ), courts presume adequate notice
of the unpled issue if there is no objection to the issue being presented, and a party
addresses that issue on the merits. See Utah R. Civ. P. 1S(b)( 1); see also Guss,

supra, 2010 UT App 249, ,I 18.
C.

This Court should reject Mr. Hill's request to interpret the
language of Rule 8(a) based on policy grounds.

As stated in Mr. Pilot's opening brief, ~nd above, the plain language of Utah
R. Civ. P. 8(a) allows a plaintiff to amend his tier designation under Rule 15which includes Rule 15(b)(l). Mr. Hill does not dispute Mr. Pilot's plain language
analysis. Instead, he suggests that this Court should ignore the language of Rule 8
and instead, based on policy reasons, determine whether an amendment under Rule
14
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15(b) is compatible with the tier systems. Mr. Hill's request is inconsistent with
@

Utah law.
The rules of civil procedure are to be interpreted according to general rules
of statutory construction. Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossing, LLC, 2010 UT
40,

~

18, 238 P.3d 1035. Therefore, they are to be interpreted based on their plain

language. Id. Only if the language is ambiguous may a court look "beyond the
plain language to 'historical evidence' and 'policy arguments."'

Id.,

~

19.

Moreover, even if this Court were willing to look beyond the language of the Rule,
~

the policy reasons cited by Mr. Hill lack merit.
Mr. Hill argues that "[i]f plaintiffs are allowed to circumvent the tier
system's cap on damages by amending their tier designation after trial, the system"
would be "left open to unscrupulous litigants [who] designate their case as Tier I or
Tier II in order to limit discovery only to later appear at trial with evidence of
damages far exceeding the tier, and expect[] that they would be able to collect
those damages without any reduction." (Opp. Br., p. 22.) That is not a correct
recitation of what occurred in this case, or of what a party can legitimately expect
to occur under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure, a party cannot simply show up at
trial with new evidence of damages and expect that this undisclosed evidence will
be admitted and his pleadings will be amended. Rather, Rule 26(d)(4) allows for
15
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only timely disclosed evidence to be presented to the jury. And in this case, Mr.
Hill does not dispute that he had timely notice of the evidence presented at trial.
Moreover, Rule 1S(b)( 1) allows recovery exceeding the amount pled only if certain
requirements are met. As discussed in Mr. Pilot's opening brief, he met those
requirements. (Aplt. Br., pp. 14-23.)
Mr. Hill also suggests that this Court should ignore the language of Rule 8
because Mr. Pilot engaged in "unscrupulous" practices by not moving to amend his
complaint when he knew that his expert witness would testify to damages
exceeding the Tier II limit and when he expressly agreed to reduce the jury's
verdict if it exceeded $299,999. This Court should decline Mr. Hill's invitation.
Utah appellate courts have advised that the Rules of Civil Procedure are to

~

be the guide. "They are designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure
which the parties and the courts can follow and rely upon." Gillett v. Price, 2006
UT 24,

,r 8,

135 P.3d 861 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in St. Jeor v. Kerr Corp.:
[Defendant] does not argue that the rule is unclear or ambiguous, but
rather that principles of fairness dictate that we introduce limitations
into the language. And while [Defendant] may disagree with the
rule's underlying policies, asking this court to rewrite the rule on the
fly is not the appropriate means to advocate for a policy shift.
Litigants ought to be able to rely on our construction of our rules and
statutes, particularly on matters as critical as the timing standard for
filing deadlines.
St. Jeor v. Kerr Corp., 2015 UT 49, ,r 13,353 P.3d 137.
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In this case, Mr. Pilot relied upon and followed the rules. Pursuant to these
rules, he timely disclosed that he would be presenting evidence of over $600,000 to
the jury. Consistent with this disclosure, Mr. Pilot requested that the jury award
over $600,000, which Mr. Hill repeated to the jury several times. Mr. Pilot never
agreed to allow the trial court to reduce the jury verdict if the case was tried as a
Tier III case. See discussion supra#. Mr. Pilot was entitled to rely upon Rule 8(a)
and Rule 15(b)(1 ). Mr. Hill cannot rewrite the rules simply because he believes
the policies behind them are "unscrupulous".
Third, Mr. Hill claims that an amendment to the tier designations under Rule
15(b) should not be allowed because it would be too difficult for the courts and the
parties to respond to an "outside the pleadings" objection. For instance, according
to Mr. Hill, had he objected to plaintiffs expert's testimony as being outside the
complaint, and the trial court granted the objection, plaintiffs expert would be
precluded from testifying or else forced to lie under oath. Likewise, Mr. Hill
claims that if there are multiple damage components that add up above the Tier II
requirements, he would be required to object to each piece of evidence.
Mr. Hill's arguments are misplaced. Trials are often fluid, and trial courts

and trial counsel are capable of dealing with objections on the spot and/or in
response to a motion in limine. In this case, the objection could have been dealt
with in any number of ways, none of which is absurd or would have required any
17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

of the parties or witnesses to lie under oath. Among other things, the trial court
could have: (1) instructed the jury regarding the tier limits, (2) allowed the Tier III
evidence to come in over Mr. Hill's objection and then analyzed whether there was
prejudice under Rule 15(b)(2), or (3) ordered that Mr. Pilot present his damage
evidence within the tier limits and/or make a request for damages within those
limits.
None of this occurred. Mr. Hill chose not to object and, instead, to
affirmatively and expressly use the size of the damages request to his own
advantage. Mr. Hill, therefore, impliedly consented to the trial of that issue, and
the trial court erred in denying Mr. Pilot's motion to amend under Rule 15(b).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's Ruling
and Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to the Evidence
at Trial, and order the trial court to enter judgment reflecting the full amount of the
jury's verdict.

~

18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DATED this 25th day of July, 2017.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

~AAA..
Karra J. Porter
Kristen C. Kiburtz
Edward T. Wells
THE PERSONAL INJURY LAW FIRM
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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